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C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000800

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: FDLR REPATRIATION UPDATE

REF: A. KINSHASA 764

[1](#)B. KINSHASA 465

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.4 B and D

[1](#)1. (SBU) SUMMARY. FDLR President Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka, MONUC DDRRR Chief, and Congolese officials went to the Kivus May 11 to try to persuade FDLR members and their families to return to Rwanda. Most Kinshasa-based international observers, however, are not optimistic about the FDLR President's chances of succeeding. END SUMMARY.

Murwanashyaka's Prospects

[1](#)2. (SBU) On May 11, FDLR President Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka, MONUC DDRRR Chief Peter Swarbrick, and three mid-level Congolese officials went to the Kivus to try to convince FDLR members and their families to return to Rwanda. Murwanashyaka is currently in Walungu and Hombo with advisors to National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo. MONUC DDRRR Chief, however, was not invited to accompany and stayed in Bukavu.

[1](#)3. (C) While in Kinshasa, Murwanashyaka met with some members of the diplomatic community (Note: but not with the U.S.). All those we spoke with said they question whether Murwanashyaka has the authority (over troops) or the political will to deliver FDLR repatriation. The Swedes and the Canadians, for example, expressed their lack of confidence in Murwanashyaka's ability to deliver. They noted that Murwanashyaka was still calling for "political space" for the FDLR, a formal "comite de suivi" to be created by the international community, and even an end to the gacaca trials. When told by the Canadian Charge that the FDLR had two choices--return to Rwanda or face military action by MONUC, Murwanashyaka laughed and said, "let them try."

Nyamwisi's Unlikely Alternative

4.(C) Minister of Regional Cooperation Mbusa Nyamwisi told poloff May 12 that there were two main reasons why the FDLR had not started large-scale repatriation--Murwanashyaka was not the right man for the job, and advisors close to the President lacked the political will to make the FDLR leave. Nyamwisi said that Murwanashyaka (a political choice without ties to the genocide) did not have much credibility with field-based units, and was personally opposed to the FDLR's unconditional return during December 2004 negotiations. Nyamwisi also claimed that advisors close to the President were actively preventing Nyamwisi's participation in the process. He asserted that if he were allowed to participate he could get at least 200 FDLR members near Lubero to repatriate immediately.

Comment

[1](#)5. (C) Many diplomatic and MONUC observers note that there increasingly are two obstacles to realizing voluntary return--Murwanashyaka's incapacity/insincerity, and Rwanda's discouraging statements. On the latter, many wonder if the U.S., possibly through the Tripartite mechanism, could not do more to encourage Rwanda. Nyamwisi's intent May 12 was clearly to re-pitch his March message to the Ambassador (reftel B)--i.e., he is the best hope for repatriating the FDLR from North Kivu--an unlikely possibility at best. We think, along with MONUC and others, and based on extensive prior experience with him, that he would be even less likely to deliver them than Murwanashyaka.

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